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MAPP V. OHIO: AN ALL-AMERICAN MISTAKE
ROBERT EMMET BURNS*
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the states. As the
decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating
of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this court as for any
reason undesirable.'

BY

O.W. Holmes, Baldwin v. Missouri

1920, evidence gathered by law enforcement officials had be-

come marked by arrests without warrants or probable cause,
and searches in violation of state law. Confessions of guilt became, with increasing frequency, the product of beatings, tricks, deprivations or extensive delays in arraignment. Few of these cases ever
reached state or federal review. Federal courts had similar problems
in dealing with interstate crimes, such as prohibition.
It was in this atmosphere of the 1920's and 1930's that the United
States Supreme Court, sitting in its capacity as chief appellate court
and supervisor of the federal court, began to hear search and seizure
cases under the fourth amendment, which had been, until then,
applicable only to the federal courts.2
The fourth amendment, which provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
*
MR. BURNs received his B.S. from the College of the Holy Cross, his LL.B.
jrom the Yale University School of Law and his LL.M. from the New York University Law School. He is a member of the Bars of Illinois, New York and Massachusetts and in currently an Associate Professor of Law at DePaul University College of Law. He is the author of a forthcoming book entitled THE HONORABLE LIE.
1. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1929).
This is a dissent by Mr.
Justice Holmes to a Supreme Court decision overturning a Missouri tax assessment
on due process grounds. He continued: "We ought to remember the great caution
shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the States, and should be slow
to construe the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as committing to the Court,
with no guide but the Court's own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the
States may pass." Id.
2. See note 32 infra.
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against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par3
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized,

was the basis for the "exclusionary rule" enunciated in Weeks v.
United States.4 In Weeks the Supreme Court held that if evidence gathered by federal officials was obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment or a rule of the Supreme Court defining reasonable methods, the "tainted" evidence would be inadmissible in federal courts. Admission of such evidence into a proceeding by a
lawyer in a federal court would require automatic reversal. Reversal was to be automatic regardless of the probative value or weight
of the untainted evidence.
The fourth amendment generally requires, as do similar clauses in
all state constitutions, that a search by a law enforcement official of
a person or place must be, in general, either "incidental" to a lawful
arrest or pursuant to a valid search warrant.' Methods of obtaining
evidence, such as wire taps,' exploratory or general searches, and
seizures without arrest become subject to the exclusionary rule in federal courts. If a federal trial judge improperly admitted real evidence, reversal was required.
In 1949, thirty-one states rejected the exclusionary rule or the socalled Weeks doctrine. Sixteen states agreed with it. 7 In the 1926
case of People v. DeFore,s the Chief Justice of the New York Court
of Appeals, Mr. Justice Cardozo, offered this evaluation of the exclusionary rule:
The question is whether protection for the individual would not be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one side is the social need that
crime shall be repressed. On the other, the social need that law shall not be
flouted by the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice. 9

In DeFore, defendant had been arrested in the corridor of his board3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment refers to real evidence-to things.
The defendant's gun, the victim's clothing, the suspect's fingerprints, the stolen merchandise are things. Real evidence, if relevant, is important in the adversary system of criminal justice.
4. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
5. See note 37 infra.
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-19 (1969) provides for the interruption of wire communications under controlled circumstances.
7. Wolf v. Colorado, 383 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
8. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 24, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926).
9. Id. at 24, 150 N.E. at 589.
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ing house for stealing an overcoat, a misdemeanor, but convicted of
possessing a weapon, a felony. An officer, without a warrant,
searched defendant's room and discovered a blackjack which was
introduced in evidence over defendant's objection. In rejecting the
Weeks rule, Cardozo wrote: "The criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered."'"
He warned that we should not subject society to these dangers
until the legislature has spoken with a "clear voice." The last words
of his opinion read:
As a last resort, the defendant invokes the Fourteenth Amendment and the requirement of "due process." The Fourteenth Amendment would not be violated, though
the privilege against self-incrimination were abolished altogether. (Citation omitted). The like must be true of the immunity against search and seizure without
warrant in so far as that immunity has relation to the use of evidence thereafter.'1

On June 17, 1949, the "voice" arrived, though not
legislature envisioned by Cardozo. The voice was not
as it was soon to become. On June 27, 1949, in Wolf v.
the United States Supreme Court held that "due process

that of the
yet as loud
Colorado, 2
of law," re-

quired by the fourteenth amendment, obliged state courts in the enforcement of their criminal law to respect the provisions of the fourth
amendment, as from time to time the United States Supreme Court
should, for all 50 states, view that fourth amendment. Frankfurter
wrote the opinion. This, like other first incorporation endeavors,
affirmed the state conviction. Though states must "respect the
Fourth Amendment," due process did not require that a state exclude
evidence which violated a federal court view of the fourth amendment
or adopt the Weeks rule of exclusion and reversal for themselves.
Frankfurter, a Federalist, wrote:
We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such
conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence . .

.

. The public

opinion of a community can far more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible to the community itself than can local
opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.1 3

And then:
We hold, therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Four10. Id. at
11. Id. at
12. Supra
13. Supra

22, 150 N.E. at 587.
25, 150 N.E. at 590.
note 7.
note 7, at 31-33.
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teenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an un14
reasonable search and seizure.

Frankfurter was troubled by his decision in Wolf v. Colorado,5
which held that evidence obtained under circumstances which would
have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law was admissible in a state court. Frankfurter, respectful of a
dual court system, envisioned that the Wolf decision called for a
"watered down version" of the federal fourth amendment in state
courts.' 6 Due process only required state adherence to the fundamentals of the fourth amendment-the exclusionary rule was not one
of those fundamentals. He wrote: "the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is basic to a free society.
It is therefore implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such
enforceable against the states through due process."' 7 The issue, as
Frankfurter saw it, was not whether the federal fourth amendment
was intended to be made applicable to the states, but was whether
the fourth amendment was "adapted," "adopted," sipped or gulped.
The last thoughts of this concededly great justice represent, in
some quarters anyway, a pathetic commentary on the subtle excellences of heritage and law at the hands of Law of the Land Review.
He wrote:
Unlike the specific requirements and restrictions placed by the Bill of Rights
(Amendments I to VIII) upon the administration of criminal justice by federal authority, the Fourteenth Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the States
to specific limitations. The notion that the "due process of law" guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this Court again and again,
after impressive consideration. See, e.g. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278; Palko v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319. Only the other day the Court reaffirmed this rejection
after thorough reexamination of the scope and function of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46. The issue is
closed.18

That is what he thought.

Though state courts would remain, and

14. Supra note 7, at 33.
15. See Justice Frankfurter's appendices to Wolf for all leading pre-1949 state
cases touching the Weeks doctrine.
16. "We cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence
of such conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way of
disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence." Supra note
7, at 31-32.
17. Supra note 7, at 27.
18. Supra note 7, at 26.
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local crime mushroom, the issue of federalism or the need for an
independent flexible state judiciary was not to be closed or settled by
stare decisis, Cardozo, Hughes, Frankfurter, Holmes or Brandeis.
Twenty short constitutional years of "due process" would repudiate
all. Every single Frankfurter decision cited was overruled by the
Warren Court."' For a constitutionally short ten years after the
Wolf opinion the Supreme Court would not reverse state convictions
obtained by evidence which in federal court might be inadmissible.
The Wolf state search and seizure test was whether the convictions
had been obtained or brought about by methods which offended the
Supreme Court's collective "sense of justice" or that "shocked the
conscience of the court. '201 In Rochin v. California,'1 police used a
stomach pump to extract some swallowed narcotics capsules. The
22
state conviction was reversed. In Breithaupt v. Abram,"
the taking
of a blood sample without a warrant did not offend fundamental
fairness, or shock the conscience of the court. The High Court, from
1949 to 1961, practiced judicial restraint in the administration of due
process amendment review of state convictions claimed to violate
the fourth amendment as "adopted" in Wolf.
Would a "watered down" law of the land work? It was going to
be difficult to keep Wolf wading. A Supreme Court justice, who
hears in the morning, as an appellate judge, an appeal in a federal
19. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) was overruled by Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) was
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1935) overruled by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) overruled by Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
20. In language that seemed to criticize their own current version of due process review, Mr. Justice Frankfurter attempted to justify it. "The vague contours of
the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large. We may not draw on our
merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in
their judicial function. Even though the concept of due process of law is not final
and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are fused in the whole
nature of our judicial process." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952).
Those "considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process"
appear to be less restraining at second glance. Justice Douglas believed that "if the
decencies of a civilized state are the test, it is repulsive to me for the police to
insert needles into an unconscious person .... ." Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S.
432, 444 (1957).
However, a majority did not agree; thus the collective conscience of the nation appears to rest in but five men.
21. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
22. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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case based on a version of the fourth amendment which requires
automatic reversal, is going to chaff a little when, in the afternoon,
he hears an appeal from a state conviction based on the same facts,
and must affirm unless the state methods used shocked its conscience or offended fundamental justice. It must have been especially
difficult when one and the same identically phrased fundamental
fourth amendment was involved in both appeals. Small wonder it
is that the antagonists in the great battle over incorporation, Justices
Black and Frankfurter, would each claim that the other's opposite
position was intolerable for exactly the same reason. Black, concurring in Rochin, but favoring incorporation, wrote:
The majority emphasize that these statements do not refer to their own consciences
or to their sense of justice and decency. For we are told that "we may not draw on
our merely personal and private notions" .... 23
If the Due Process Clause does vest this court with such unlimited power to invalidate laws, I am still in doubt as to why we should consider only the notions of English speaking peoples to determine what are immutable and fundamental principles
of justice. Moreover, one may well ask what avenues of investigation are open to
discover 'canons' of conduct so universally favored that this Court should write them
into the Constitution? All we are told is that the discovery must be made by an
"evaluation based on disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a
24
balanced order of facts."
I long ago concluded that the accordion-like qualities of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the
Bill of Rights. Reflection and recent decisions of this Court sanctioning abridgement
of freedom of speech and press have strengthened this conclusion. 25

Frankfurter, dissenting in Elkins v. United States, but opposed to
incorporation, wrote:
The divisions in this Court over the years regarding what is and what is not to be
deemed an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and
the shifting views of members in the Court in this regard, prove that in evolving the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment the decisions of this Court have frequently
turned on dialectical niceties and have not reflected those fundamental considerations of civilized conduct on which applications of the Due Process Clause turn.
See, for example, the varying views of the Court as a whole, and of individual
members, regarding the "reasonableness" under the Fourth Amendment of searches
without warrants incident to arrests.
What the Court now decides is that these variegated judgments, these fluctuating and
uncertain views of what constitutes an "unreasonable search" under the Fourth
Amendment in conduct by federal officials are to determine whether what is done
by state police, wholly beyond federal supervision, violates the Due Process Clause. 26
23.
24.
25.
26.

Supra note 21, at 175 (Black, J., concurring).
Supra note 21, at 176.
Supra note 21, at 177.
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 238 (1960).
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Were they both right? Due process review was arbitrary if it incorporated the fourth and arbitrary if it did not. Maybe the fourteenth was not intended to give the Supreme Court ultimate power
over the states.27
In Elkins, wire tap evidence obtained by Oregon State Police was
admitted in a federal district court prosecution. Wire tap evidence
had been held inadmissible in the federal court and subject to the
Weeks exclusionary rule when obtained by federal officials. Since,
however, the federal officials did not participate in the search and
illegality and the evidence was relevant, it was admitted at trial and
the defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed. In a
5 to 4 decision it held that the federal exclusionary rule should have
been applied even though the rationale for the rule was to punish or
deter federal offenders and the offenders in Elkins were state officials
beyond the control of a federal court.28
Once the use of the "tainted" evidence became separated from the
user it would be a constitutional mini-step to require all states to
adopt the federal exclusionary rule. Frankfurter could see the handwriting on the wall. It was June, 1960. He wrote:
The underlying assumption on which the exclusionary rule of Weeks rests is that
barring evidence illegally secured will have an inhibiting, one hopes a civilizing,
influence upon law officers. With due respect, it is fanciful to assume that lawenforcing authorities of States which do not have an exclusionary rule will to any
significant degree be influenced by the potential exclusion in federal prosecutions of
evidence secured by them when state prosecutions, which surely are their preoccupation, remain free to use the evidence. At any rate, what warrant is there for the
federal courts to assume the same supervisory control over state officials as they
have assumed over federal officers, even if that control could be effective? And
the exertion of controlling pressures upon the police is admittedly the only
2
justification for any exclusionary rule. ,

In May, 1957, three Cleveland police officers arrived at the residence of Miss Dolores Mapp, apparently for a search. When she
demanded a search warrant, a paper was shown her which Miss
Mapp grabbed and shoved down her bosom. It was retrieved in an
ungentlemanly fashion by one of the officers who then searched her
apartment and discovered obscene material. Miss Mapp was indicted
and convicted in an Ohio court for having in her possession lewd
27. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. (1949).
28. Supra note 26.
29. Supra note 26, at 241 (emphasis added).
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books.30 There was considerable doubt in the trial record whether
there ever was any warrant for the search of her home. On appeal
from the conviction to the Supreme Court, the federal exclusionary
rule was applied. It became a part of the fourth amendment,
binding on the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The effect of Mapp v. Ohio81 was to give the Supreme
Court the constitutional power and duty to define, on a selected
case basis, what was "reasonable" under the fourth amendment for
every single state and federal trial court in the nation. 2
Justice Harlan, in a dissent joined by Frankfurter and Whittaker,
wrote bitterly:
[F]ive members of this Court have simply "reached out" to overrule Wolf.33 ...
I would think that our obligation to the States, on whom we impose this new rule,
as well as the obligation of orderly adherence to our own processes would demand
that we seek that aid which adequate briefing and argument lends to the determination of an important issue. It certainly has never been a postulate of judicial
power that mere altered disposition, or subsequent membership on the Court, is
sufficient warrant for overturning a deliberately decided rule of Constitutional
law.
Thus, if the Court were bent on reconsidering Wolf, I think that there would
soon have presented itself an appropriate opportunity in which we could have had
the benefit of full briefing and argument. In any event, at the very least, the
present case should have been set down for reargument, in view of the inadequate
briefing and argument we have received on the Wolf point. To all intents and
purposes the Court's present action amounts to a summary reversal of Wolf, without
s4
argument.

Why did the Supreme Court decide to make uniform for all courts
30. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31. Id.
32. In 1890 the Supreme Court first employed the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to overrule state-established railroad rates. Chicago Ry. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). The same clause was used to prevent: a state
from establishing a maximum work week, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905); from outlawing "yellow dog" contracts, whereby an employer, as a condition
of employment, bound employees not to join or remain a member of a union, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); and Congress from prohibiting child labor,
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Seventy years after regulating reasonable railroad rates, the Court was regulating reasonable police conduct. Although it
may be argued today that the Supreme Court represents the mainstream of community conscience, and therefore that its legislative activities should pass unquestioned, it should be clear to those other than the antagonists of contemporary decisions that yesterday's due process review represented different values. Perhaps with
a change in the personnel of the Court, as has been true in the past, antagonist will
become protagonist.
33. Supra note 30, at 674.
34. Supra note 30, at 677.
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the exclusionary rule? More importantly, why did the Court assume
the onerous task of defining what was reasonable under the fourth

amendment for every hamlet in the United States? Was it because
state courts have failed to control police methods in obtaining convictions? Perhaps it was the enervation of role diffusion or the day-

night review exercise called for by the Wolf decision. Maybe it was
the damnedness of the phrase "due process," that inviting lure that had
seduced more than one Supreme Court with the fragrances of perfect
reason.M6 Was it the briefs, oral arguments, or the grace and ex-

cellence of Rowland Watts, amicus curiae representing the American
Civil Liberties Union? Surely the Supreme Court had not in fortyfive years of search for ideal federal law enforcement standards found
consensus in their own constitutional courts."
Could the exclusionary rule work when it required, at bare minimum, clear distinct rule concensus which had been notably absent
in the Court's own prior opinion on federal court matters? A nine
man rule of reason almost seems destined for vagueness, especially
when each justice has a legal and moral right to write concurring
or dissenting opinions (and thus to be remembered that way). s In35. Supra note 32.
36. As Justice Frankfurter suggested in Elkins, supra note 26. Compare Marrow
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) with Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344 (1931) and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart, supra and
Lefkowitz, supra with Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); compare Harris, supra with Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); compare Trupiano with Rabinowitz supra.
J. Edgar Hoover once complained that in the twenty Supreme Court decisions,
between 1941 and 1955, involving search and seizure in federal courts, the Justices
disagreed in every one as to what the police should have done. Burns, Moral Imperatives, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 3 LOYOLA L. TIMES 7, 8
(1963). See also Waite, Whose Rules? The Problem of Improper Police Methods,
48 A.B.A.J. 1057 (1962).
37. This is quite an impossible subject upon which to work a universal fiftystate standard promulgated by the opinions of nine justices. Enforcement of the
fourth amendment standard requires the answer to a number of complex questions:
Was the evidence taken incident to an arrest? Was there an "arrest?" When is
stopping an arrest? Was an arrest made pursuant to a "valid" warrant? Was there
"probable cause" for a "valid" arrest without a warrant? Which came first, the
"search" or the arrest? Was the evidence a result of "hot pursuit?" Was it seized
in "plain view?" Is it "mere evidence?" Was there consent to the search? Is the
evidence the "fruit" of an illegal search? Has the complainant "standing to object?"
In every case the question must be asked whether the evidence of defendant's guilt
was obtaind properly. Was the search of defendant's car, home, room, trunk, person, "unreasonable?" Let no one doubt the complexity of the area. See LaFave,
Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . . . Has Not. . . Run Smooth, 1966
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deed, the very legal processes of adversary brief and oral argument
before the Supreme Court demand from all lawyers on each side a
positive touch for his honor's published thoughts written on another
day for a different case but so very apropos of defendant's or people's plight in the appeal before the Court.
Even so, by 1960 some of the academia, who appreciate distinctions even more than do practicing attorneys, become nonplussed
by the failure of the Supreme Court to articulate clearly what was and
was not, in federal court, a "reasonable search" under the fourth
amendment. Thus wrote Professor Waite of the Michigan Law
School in 1962:
From this welter of individual opinions no standards, no principles, have evolved;
no tests by which the propriety of a police action can be determined. Except in
obvious situations no officer can be sure in advance whether the criminal he arrests will be convicted, or he himself be condemned and the criminal released. 38

All this was before Mapp v. Ohio took the High Court to open
sea; when the exclusionary rule became applicable to all the states,
making state standards identical to those in federal courts.
Most states have tried to follow and apply the Supreme Court's
legislative rules of reason in the search and seizure areas. Here, for
instance, are the facts in Hadley v. State, 9 a 1968 Indiana Supreme
Court decision on appeal from a theft conviction obtained through
the admission in evidence of a typewriter allegedly stolen and subsequently seized by police:
The evidence thus presented indicates that three men were seen about the oil plant
from which a typewriter, later introducd in evidence over Appellant's objections,
had been removed; . . . several police officers promptly arrived at the scene; some
of the officers were informed that these three men were seen leaving the plant with
a typewriter and had sought refuge in a nearby residence, which is the home of the
40
parents of two of the men involved who were emancipated.

Three judges form the majority opinion:
It is not always ncessary to have a warrant of arrest to make a lawful arrest.
The record herein suggests to us that the officers of the law were conducting an
investigation of a reported burglary, almost immediately following the perpetration
of such felony, in fact, while efforts were being made by the Appellant to 'get away'
U. ILL. L.F., 255, a 134 page, 805 footnote article. Accord: Kaplan, Search and
Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 474 (1961) and
Thompson, Illinois Search and Seizure Law-The New Frontier, 11 DEPAUL L. REV.
27 (1961).

38.
39.
40.

Waite, supra note 36, at 1058.
238 N.E,2d 888, 892 (1968).
Id. at 892.
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and to bide in the home where he was found and where he had been seen to enter.
It is a fair conclusion, we think, that the officers were fairly hot on the trail and
we find nothing unlawful about the arrest under41the circumstances here presented
and certainly the trial jury had the right to so find.

The two dissenting judges said that the search was illegal, citing
175 federal and Indiana decisions. 42 The middle-middle judges, who
concur with the majority result, cited 200 United States Supreme
Court decisions in an attempt to "clarify the area," pausing to state:
FAlt the outset, it should be stated that the wide variance of opinion, as expressed
in the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions, may by large measure stem from
this Court's efforts to stay abreast with the rapidly changing, and to say the least,
43
chaotic . . . dimensions of this field of law.

And where does all this leave Officer Friendly in Gary? Is it all a
game? Why must the Supreme Court continue a futile quest for
uniform principles in fifty states when such are simply impossible?
Suppose, for instance, in Hadley v. State,44 the officers searched for
two hours for a rapist, and defendant demanded a search warrant,
but no one was home and the police were in short supply on the day
in question. It should surprise no one that five years after Mapp a
124 page, 805 footnote law review article should appear, entitled
Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law . . . Has Not . . .
Run Smooth. 45 How could it? An impossible task is bound to be
frustrating. Arrest and search are based on appearances of the
moment in unique spatial and temporal circumstances. One cannot
provide nouns, rules, absolutes, and "is" direction for a "to be"
process. Especially is this so when performing a post hoc judicial
review in a stated controversy over disputed happenings. The visibility level of a Supreme Court in review of real evidence admitted
in state trials is a bit constrained.
The Miller murder case is instructive on the point.4
Miller was
tried and convicted of the murder of an eight-year old girl by evidence which included a pair of undershorts which the state contended
were stained with blood. Seven years later, after a federal habeas
corpus hearing and subsequent appeal, the High Court handed down
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Supra note 39, at 892.
Supra note 39, at 901-11.
Supra note 39, at 895.
Supra note 39.
LaFave, supra note 37.
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1966).
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an opinion stating the prosecuters "deliberately misrepresented the
truth"4 7 in contending that a pair of undershorts found within a mile
of the murder were stained with blood. The Supreme Court opinion said that the garment was stained, not with blood but with
brown paint. The prosecutors knew this. The Court freed Miller.
Following sensational publicity associated with the Supreme Court's
holding, a special committee of the Illinois State Bar Association commenced an investigation of the matter to determine whether the prosecutors should be disbarred or disciplined.
Nine months and a three
thousand page record search followed.
It became apparent to the Committee early in its investigation that the United States
Supreme Court had misapprehended the facts of the case. At the trial, which took
place in 1956, the state chemist testified that there were bloodstains on the shorts in
question. Prior to the trial, the prosecutors had been given a laboratory report from
the Illinois State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, which disclosed that the shorts did, in fact, contain blood. The state chemist further testified
at the trial that the blood on the shorts was type "A" which was the same type as
that of the victim.
The Committee found no reason to doubt that there was blood on the shorts. Accordingly, the Committee found that there was no basis for the view of the United
States Supreme Court that the prosecution had been guilty of a misrepresentation
when it asserted as a fact that the shorts contained blood.
The Commitee concluded that the decision of the United States Supreme Court was
based entirely upon a portion of the testimony which had been given at the habeas
corpus hearing in the United States District Court of Chicago. The Supreme Court
rejected the testimony given at the original trial eleven years earlier, and ignored the
testimony of the state chemist who again testified at the habeas corpus proceed49
ings that there was blood on the shorts.

The Bar Association committee went on to state that, in addition to
the blood, there was paint on the shorts which, in the opinion of the
committee, had some tendency to corroborateMiller's confession that
he left them in the area.
One must remember that the appellate advocate who writes, in
brief, the statement of the facts for the High Court is usually seeking
constitutional vindication, release, re-trial, or settlement. The final
decision is bound to be influenced by captive versions of the facts
times nine. This alone could account for the over fifty per cent concurring and dissenting written opinion rate in the fourth amendment
47. Id. at 6.
48. See Report, Grievance Committee's Findings Re Prosecution of the Miller
Murder Case, 56 ILL. B. J. 955 (1968).
49. Id. at 956.
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cases." What would you do as Supreme Court Justice with the following situation:
Tom Jones was convicted of operating a still to make moonshine liquor. The still
was discovered after deputies went to the home of the petitioner's grandmother who,
when told by the officers that they had a warrant, let them in. The issue is simple:
Was consent given for the search which made it reasonable under the fourth
amendment?

One view of the facts is:
Four of them came. I was busy about my work and they walked into the house
and one of them walked up and said 'I have a search warrant to search your house'
and I walked out and told them to come in . . . . He just come on in and said he
had a warrant to search the house and he didn't read it to me or nothing. So, I just
told him to come on in and go ahead and search and I went on about my work.
I wasn't concerned what he was about. I was just satisfied. He just told me he
had a search warrant, but he didn't read it to me. He did tell me he had a search
warrant. He said he was the law and had a search warrant to search the house, why
I thought he could go ahead. I believed he had a search warrant. I took him at
his word. I just seen them out there in the yard. They got through the door when I
opened it. At that time, I did not know my grandson had been charged with crime.
Nobody told me anything. They didn't tell me anything, just picked it up like that.
They didn't tell me nothing about my grandson.

Another view is:
He did tell me he had a search warrant. I don't know if Sheriff Stockard was
with him. I was not paying much attention. I told Mr. Stockard (after he had
come up on the porch) to go ahead and look all over the house. I had no objection
to them making a search of my house. I was willing to let them look in any room
or drawer in my house they wanted to. Nobody threatened me with anything.
Nobody told me they were going to hurt me if I didn't let them search my house.
Nobody told me they would give me any money if I would let them search. I let
them search and it was all my own free will. Nobody forced me at all. 5 1

Should the defendant's conviction be reversed in order to prevent,
deter, or discourage police impropriety or unreasonableness in obtaining this kind of consent? Was there a consent in fact? Could
reasonable men differ in the answer to the questions?
Add some data or ingredients: (A) There was a valid search
warrant, but the officers did not have it with them; (B) there was a
dispute in the records on point (A); (C) there was eye witness
testimony of two witnesses who saw defendant making whiskey
(This other evidence was sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable
50. See Statistics in Supreme Court, Terms 1957-1967, Harv. L. Rev., Vols. 71-82.
51. The preceding fact situations were taken from the opinion of the Court in
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), written by Mr. Justice Stewart,
and from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black.
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doubt).
Have things changed any? Could reasonable men differ? Now keep
all of the facts, including (A), (B) and (C), but substitute a rape for
52
a bottle. The real affair is Bumper v. North Carolina.
Justice
Black's dissent stated:
The victims were a young man and his girl friend. At trial both testified in detail
to the following: They were parked shortly after dusk on a country road not far
from where the petitioner Bumper lived. Bumper approached the car, stuck a
rifle barrel up to the window and ordered the girl to get out of the car, indicating
that if she refused he would shoot her. Both got out of the car and Bumper ordered
the girl to undress, stating that 'I want a white girl's p .

. . .'

When the girl ada-

mantly refused, Bumper pointed the rifle at the young man, and the girl, understanding that she must submit or her boy friend would be killed, followed Bumper's orders.
Bumper then forced the young man into the rear seat of the car, requiring him to
stay down on the floor, while Bumper raped the girl on the back of the car. A
short time after this, Bumper forced the couple to drive to another spot. Here he
made them get out of the car and walk down a dirt road into some bushes. At this
time Bumper told the couple he was going to kill them, and when they pleaded with
him to let them go, he replied, "I can't do it; you will go to the cops." The couple
then suggested that if Bumper would tie them up and blindfold them that he could
get away with no problem. This Bumper did, tying each to a separate tree. But
he did not leave. Instead he raped the girl again while she was tied to the tree.
After this, Bumper went over to the young man and felt his chest, asking him
where his heart was and if he was scared. He then cooly proceeded to shoot the
young man where he thought his heart was. The girl, tied to the tree and blindfolded, heard the shot, and a moment later herself was shot through the left breast
close to her heart. Bumper then took the car and drove away, obviously believing
he had killed the young couple. They were able to free themselves, however, and
with much difficulty made their way to a nearby house where the owner got them to
a hospital. The time during which the couple was held captive was approximately
an hour and a half. During that time they clearly got to know who their assailant was. Both got a plain view of Bumper right at the beginning of their ordeal
when they opened the car doors and saw his face in the light coming from the inside of the car. Moreover, the undisputed evidence in the record shows that the
night of the attack was a bright moonlit night. Both testified positively at trial that
it was Bumper. Also there was substantial corroborating evidence outside of that
relating to the rifle. Here we have the clear and convincing testimony of the two
victims, whose characters were in no way impeached or challenged. The only witnesses at the trial were state witnesses (the two victims plus medical and police testimony), and none of their testimony was refuted or denied in any way. Thus, this
is a case where every word of evidence introduced at trial pointed to guilt, and there
was no challenge to the truthfulness of the State's evidence, nor to the character of
any of its witnesses. Yet even with all this, the Court persists in reversing the
case, thus requiring the State to hold a new trial if it wishes to punish Bumper for
his crimes.58
52.
53.

391 U.S. 543 (1968).
Supra note 52, at 558-60.
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Mr. Justice White dissented. 4 He thought that the case should
be remanded to determine at the North Carolina trial level whether
there was a warrant. He said that he would reverse unless the error
was harmless. The majority must have hated to reverse Bumper v.
North Carolina. They had to. Now here lies a story. In criminal
trials, only trial errors which are substantial, important, prejudicial
and harmful to defendants are supposed to warrant the reversal of
convictions. If, for instance, illegal evidence is wrongfully admitted
but there was other untained legal evidence sufficient to convict, the
illegal error should be "harmless," hence no reversal.
The Supreme Court "kicker" is this. A constitutional error must
be both harmful and substantial to require reversal, or else the deterrent effect which is the raison d'etre or rationale for the exclusionary rule will not be served. But, the Supreme Court, having
adopted a policy of punishing human turpitude or error by reversing
convictions, was and still is troubled by the truth that defendants
convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, by legal and untainted evidence, ought not to have their convictions reversed when the error
in factum terms was but harmless. The Court should vindicate the
premises of the adversary system.
Here is an example of the Supreme Court's quest to serve in state
courts both masters: In Griffin v. California,5 5 decided in 1965,
it was held by a 5 to 4 vote that it was unconstitutional for the prosecution to comment on the failure of the defendant to take the stand
on his own behalf and testify at his trial. However, California state
prosecutors, after the decision, continued to comment to the jury on
the defendant's invocation of his right not to testify. The California
appeal court continued to affirm convictions on grounds that comment on failure to testify was harmless error. Then in the Chapman
5" case the Supreme Court, 5 to 4, reversed every state's
v. California
harmless error rules by providing that no violation of a few hundred
constitutional rights, including rights under specific rules of reason of
the fourth amendment would be considered harmless unless proved
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. Even so, the logic
of the Mapp rule requires an automatic reversal every time a Supreme
54.
55.
56.
which

Supra note 52, at 561.
380 U.S. 609 (1965).
See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969),
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
dissenters contend overrules Chapman.

19691

MAPP V. OHIO: AN ALL AMERICAN MISTAKE

Court rule is violated, irrespective of other evidence of guilt. Otherwise the offending officer will not be properly chastised, disciplined
or deterred.
In search and seizure cases the Supreme Court rides two horses
which gallop in opposite directions. Concern for the integrity of the
adversary system animates a feeling that constitutional errors not tainting or affecting other independent evidence of guilt ought not to
occasion reversals and release or retrials. This is the policy of
'harmless error" never expressly repudiated. The other stallion rides
this way: if police are to be effectively disciplined or encouraged,
the High Court must hold violations of rights to "civilized" procedures never harmless. Violations of procedural rights must then
occasion reversal, irrespective of actual guilt.
The automatic reversal rule for constitutional error provides strong
incentives to appeal for single constitutional error warrants automatic
reversal and a chance for a plea or settlement with the prosecutor the
second time. Constitutional errors by police, judge and even defendant's lawyer theoretically must in logic, vitiate a conviction, irrespective of actual guilt.
California's Judicial Council's 1969 report to the Governor attributes their "startling" appeal rate (1969-70) from .09 per cent to 20
per cent and their persistent docket delay despite double the number
of new appeal judges to "frivolous" appeals."7 If by "frivolous"
one means all violations of constitutional rights which do not affect
guilt or innocence of the offense charged, then of course invasion
of all fourth amendment search and seizure rights appeals, which
affect not one iota the probative worth of the real evidence seized
unfairly, are "frivolous." On the other hand, if the Court is to properly discipline police, the appeal courts must never hold the admission of unfairly seized real evidence to be harmless.
But does the Mapp rule work at all? From all appearances the
police are unconcerned with most of their own department regulations, much less with divided Supreme Court opinions offering police
consolation or rebuke depending upon whom you are reading. It is
an eminently fair question to ask whether local police, well aware
of calendar turnover and voluntary guilty pleas in urban centers, are
57.
(1966).
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in fact deterred or encouraged to be fairer than otherwise. If capital
punishment does not deter an offender because it will not happen,
why should court exclusion of evidence or appellate reversal of trial
decisions deter police when ninety per cent of the time there will be no
trial?
In urban areas Mapp has, for plain people, a quantum settlement
value payable in a reduced charge or sentence. When police confront injustice and persuade defendant to plead guilty, they will
bring with them all of the real evidence irrespective of violations
of Supreme Court decisions.58
Mapp, in a few categories of crimes such as narcotics possession,
may have elevated police perjury to standard form dimensions.
Spend a few hours in the New York City Criminal Court these days and you will
hear case after case in which a policeman testifies that the defendant dropped the
narcotics on the ground whereupon the policeman arrested him.
The judge has no reason to disbelieve this "dropsy" testimony in any particular case.
Naturally, he must decide each case on its own evidence, without regard to the testimony in other cases. Surely, though, not in every case was the defendant rash
enough or unlucky enough to drop his narcotics at the feet of a policeman. It follows that at least in some of these cases the police are lying.
Why? Policemen believe themselves to be fighting a two-front war against criminals
in the street and against "liberal" rules of law in the court. All's fair in this war,
including perjury, to subvert those "liberal" rules that might free defendants who
59
"ought" to be jailed.

The obfuscation is highlighted by two decisions in 1960; for the
prosecutor there was Rabinowitz6" (People's handbook) and for the
defendant Chapman"' (Defendant's handbook). Each case stood
58. Even with the less persuasive illegal testimonial evidence, ponder the significance of this probably accurate state of affairs in that area: "The existence or
threatened use of a coerced confession may not itself render the guilty plea involuntary. A defendant who has a basis for claiming that his confession was coerced
may nevertheless elect to forego that claim and to plead guilty-whether because of
'his own knowledge of his guilt and a desire to take his medicine.' Doran v. Wilson,
369 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1966); because 'he also knows that other admissible
evidence will establish his guilt overwhelmingly.' White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d
470, 472 (4th Cir. 1965); because he prefers to plead guilty to a lesser charge rather
than run the risk of conviction on a more serious charge; or because for some other
reason he determines that it is in his best interest to plead guilty." United States
v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
59. Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure?, 3 TRIAL 41
(Aug., Sept., 1967).
60. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
61. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
Joined by Frankfurter,
Harlan and Whittaker, Justice Clark bitterly dissented in Chapman: "For some
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for opposite alternatives, and neither was overruled.
In Rabinowitz the defendant was indicted for passing and concealing forged postage stamps. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction which was based on evidence obtained by
the police pursuant to an arrest, but without a search warrant. In
Chapman federal officers smelled whiskey odors emanating from defendant's apartment. The police summoned the landlord who let the
police enter. An illegal still was seized and admitted into evidence
at the trial. The police could have gotten a search warrant, but an
officer testified he "never got one on Sunday." The court reversed
the liquor law conviction because the evidence was based on an
illegal search and seizure without a warrant.
And where is the Court twenty years later? What has changed?
In Chimel v. California," decided on June 23, 1969, petitioner was
convicted of burglary of a coin shop. The evidence included some
coins which were found after a search of defendant's home. The
officers had arrived at defendant's apartment with an arrest warrant
in connection with the burglary of a coin shop. Two minutes after
police entered the apartment, defendant arrived home and was served
with the warrant. Officers asked and were refused permission to
"look around." Forty-five minutes later the officers found coins in
defendant's bedroom. The coins were seized, admitted in evidence
and the defendant convicted. He appealed to the California Supreme Court which affirmed. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the Justices decided that these facts were a good vehicle
to clarify the area. They reversed his conviction.
The opinion is but another rendition of an old dance performed
after Mapp by an additional fifty states and a few thousand more
judges. Let us call it legal rhythm to the tune of "One More Time."
Start with observation that the Chimel case raises "basic" questions
years now the field has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire. It
fashions a novel rule, supporting it with an old theory long since overruled. If
Rabinowitz is no longer law the Court should say so. It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the inconsistent rules laid down in these cases. It
turns the wellsprings of democracy-law and order-into a slough of frustration. It
turns crime detection into a game of cops and robbers. We hear much these
days of an increasing crime rate and a breakdown in law enforcement. Some place
the blame on police officers. I say there are others that must shoulder much of
that responsibility." Id. at 622-23.
62. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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concerning the permissible scope under the fourth amendment of a
search incident to a lawful arrest. Now clarify with appropriate
quotes from yesterday's uniform rules:"3
Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to have been
articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 .... 64
The statement made no reference to any right to search the place where an arrest
occurs, but was limited to a right to search the "person." Eleven years later the
case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 brought the following embellishment
65
of the Weeks statement.
Still, that assertion too was far from a claim that the "place" where one is arrested
may be searched so long as the arrest is valid. Without explanation, however, the
principle emerged in expanded form a few months later in Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20-although still by way of dictum. 66
That the Marron opinion did not mean all that it seemed to say became evident,
however, a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452. In each of those cases the opinion of
the Court was written by Mr. Justice Butler, the author of the opinion in Marron.6 7
The limiting views expressed in Go-Bart and Lejkowitz were thrown to the
winds, however, in Harrisv. United States, 331 U.S. 145, decided in 1947.68
Only a year after Harris, however, the pendulum swung again. In Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, agents raided the site of an illicit distillery, saw one of
several conspirators operating the still, and arrested him, contemporaneously "seiz(ing) the illicit distillery." Id. at 702. The Court held that the arrest and others
made subsequently had been valid, but that the unexplained failure of the agents to
procure a search warrant-in spite of the fact that they had had more than enough
time before the raid to do so-rendered the search unlawful. 69
In 1950, two years after Trupiano, came United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
the decision upon which California primarily relies in the case now before us. 70
Even limited to its own facts the Rabinowitz decision was, as we have seen, hardly
founded on an unimpeachable line of authority. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented in dissent in the case, the "hint" contained in Weeks was, without persuasive
justification, "loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision." 339
U.S. at 75. And the approach taken in cases such as Go-Bart, Lefkowitz, and
Trupiano was essentially disregarded by the Rabinowitz Court. 7 1

Now the Court dance continues with side together, side togetherthe Founding Fathers Shuffle:
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id.at 753.
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,
Supra note 62,

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

755.
755-60.
760-61.
763-64.
766.
767.
768.
774.
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Nor is the rationale by which the State seeks here to sustain the search of the petitioner's house supported by a reasoned view of the background and purpose of the
Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wisely pointed out in his Rabinowitz
dissent that the Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable search and seizures"
must be read in light of "the history that gave rise to the words"-a history of
"abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the
Revolution . . ." 339 U.S. at 69.72

And to things as they are:
This is the principle that underlays our decision in Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364. In that case three men had been arrested in a parked car, which had
later been towed to a garage and searched by police. We held the search to have
that it had been
been unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, despite the contention
78
incidental to a valid arrest. Our reasoning was straightforward.

Now the expressed enervation to it all:
It would be possible, of course, to draw a line between Rabinowitz and Harris on
the one hand, and this case on the other. For Rabinowitz involved a single room,
us an entire house was
and Harris a four room apartment, while in the case before
74
searched. But such a distinction would be highly artificial.

But then this need to rectify the injustices of other uniform opinions
on the subject:
The petitioner correctly points out that one result of decisions such as Rabinowitz
and Harrisis to give law enforcement officials the opportunity to engage in searches
simple expedient of arranging to arrest susnot justified by probable cause, by the
75
pects at home rather than elsewhere.

And then one last time, that comfortable universal, the clear, tidy
formula and the easy-to-follow wooden absolute which will solve all:
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this case produces a clear result. The search here went far beyond the petitioner's person and
the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him. There was no constitutional
justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that
area. The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the7 6 Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot stand.

And tomorrow: lawyers will grab phrases from the majority, the
concurring and the two dissenting opinions, particularly Justice
72. Supra note 62, at 760-61. How inappropriate to quote Frankfurter, an untired enemy of gross incorporation of the fourth amendment. For a deathbed article
written by Frankfurter rejecting the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
fourteenth amendment, see Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation of the Bill
of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 78 HARv. L.
REV.

73.
74.
75.
76.

746 (1965).
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
Supra note
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Black's dissent, to array before this or another five bodies on a show
cause, due process, constitutional basis to explain why this final constitutional word should be distinguished, overruled or ignored. Then
that case will read:
But on this (our) (that) case no warrant should (be) (have been) required, for here
there was a distinct possibility that the defendant's sister-in-law would remove or
hide the evidence while officers were in the process of obtaining a search warrant.
As Mr. Justice White said in a dissent joined by Mr. Justice Black in Chinel v.
State of California, 395 U.S. 752, at 774: "This case provides a good illustration
of my point that it is unreasonable to require police to leave the scene of an arrest
in order to obtain a search warrant when they already have probable cause to
they may reasonably
search and there is a clear danger that the items for which
77
search will be removed before they return with a warrant."

Enough is enough. These processes would not deter or enlighten
a policeman in Gary with a Ph.D. who was going to law school at
night. It is time for the Court to abandon their quest for a fourteenth amendment due process constitutional common law of search
and seizure.
It seems ironic, but except for due process, judge-made law or the
common law whose beauty was its flexibility and capacity to grow
and adapt to changing times through court decisions, was both before and after the passage of the fourteenth amendment the exclusive
domain of state courts and not federal judges. The United States
Supreme Court is not a common law court. There is no common law
constitution.
Once before, without constitutional or statutory authority, (i.e.,
Judiciary Act of 1789) federal courts attempted to compete with
state law and judges by the creation of a federal common law, a
process Mr. Justice Holmes referred to as "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of
time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to cor78
rect."
It is time to localize search and seizure and state fourth amendment enforcement. This amendment's more visible state problems
deserve a whisper of Supreme Court realism.
It is time for an agonizing reappraisal of the Mapp decision. There
should be returned to the states the options denied them by an in77.
78.

Supra note 62, at 774.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1937).
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corporated fourth amendment exclusion rule. And why no reappraisal? Mr. Justice Douglas once observed "happily all Constitutional questions are always open."7 A due process Mapp review
would seem overdue.
79.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963).

